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Exploring the critiques of the Social Model of Disability: The transformative 
SRVVLELOLW\RI$UHQGW¶VQRWLRQRISRZHU 
 
 
 
The social model of disability: introduction and critique 
 
The social model of disability has demonstrated success for disabled people in 
society, challenging discrimination and marginalisation, linking civil rights and 
political activism; enabling disabled people to claim their rightful place in society. Its 
creation has been akin to a New Social Movement whereby disabled people can 
gather together and challenge their experiences of oppression through political 
activism (Finklestein 1990, Oliver 1990).  Activists argue that it is a powerful tool to 
produce social and political change (Thomas, 2004, Oliver 2009, Anastasiou and 
Keller 2011), to discuss the socio-historic oppression of disabled people (Oliver and 
Barnes 1998, Longmore 2003), and as a driver for emancipatory research (Walmsley 
2001, Walmsley and Johnson 2003, Booth and Booth 1996, 1998).    
 
These positive moves forwards have been enshrined in the doctrines of rights and 
equality; highlighting the importance of removing social barriers to the inclusion and 
participation of disabled people, simultaneously placing the responsibility for these 
issues onto society.   Within the UK especially, the social model of disability 
originated through a series of discussions in 1975 between the Disability Alliance and 
the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS).  Their aim was to 
consider ways in which disabled people could become more active and involved in 
their affairs (UPAIS and Disability Alliance 1975).  UPIAS viewed disability as an 
artefact of society rather than something inherently within, or a product of the body.  
  
If society did not create dependency then disability would disappear. Focusing on 
VRFLHW\DVWKHURRWFDXVHRIGLVDELOLW\QRWLPSDLUPHQWXVLQJWKHWHUPVµVRFLDODQG
LQGLYLGXDOPRGHOVRIGLVDELOLW\¶KDVDUJXDEO\EHFRPHD double edged sword.  It has 
been used successfully for political activism; simultaneously creating conflict and 
tensions within disability studies, sociology, and sociology of the body (Shakespeare 
and Watson 1995, 2010, Thomas 2004, 2007).  Critical disability studies seek to move 
away from the materialist basis of the social model of disability, but so far there has 
been no consensus on a way forward. 
 
For the UK social model, disability is a social construct, and any differences are 
defined by whatever label applied. An individual is evaluated and labelled through a 
process of power which then serves to separate them from mainstream society, 
education, work, or social interaction, because they deviate from the dominant norm 
and difference is not valued. What becomes apparent is the rigidity of the definition of 
disability for the UK social model in particular; focusing exclusively on oppression 
and linking capitalism as the causative factor.  What this linking has failed to 
recognise is that whilst forms of oppression share similarities they simultaneously 
exhibit important differences.   
 
The focus of this paper is not to discuss the ways in which a social model of disability 
may be developed; it is to shed light on the confusion that surrounds it by discussing 
the historical emergence of what are essentially different forms of the social model. 
This is followed by an analysis and evaluation of the key criticisms of the various 
models. The paper then goes on to explore the relevance of different forms of power 
to the current discourse on disability that has emerged through critical disability 
  
studies, before proceeding to explore in depth what might be gained from the 
approach of one particular theorist on power; Hannah Arendt. 
 
The different forms of the social model of disability: a brief history 
The first thing to note about the social model of disability is that there are pluralities 
of approaches. Recently, Carol Thomas (1999, 2001, and 2007) has suggested 
reframing the UK social model of disability as the µVRFLDOUHODWLRQal model of 
GLVDELOLW\¶. We will return to the social relational model of disability in the section on 
Arendt.  
 
The µNordic social relative model of disability¶ evolved from the 1960s onwards more 
along the lines of what might be termed a salutogenic approach which rejects the 
medical model dichotomy between illness and health (Antonovsky 1979, 1987).  In 
Sweden particularly, the social relative model of disability developed as the result of 
the welfare state which evolved focusing on the entry of women into the labour 
market and family policies (Berg 2004). The individual is seen as interacting with 
their environment and whilst the environment is considered as a factor, functional 
aspects of impairment and their consequences for the individual are also recognised as 
being of importance. Disability exists on a continuum shifting between the individual 
and their environment; focusing on activities and abilities, rather than being the 
defining characteristic of the individual (Söder 1982).  Whilst the UK social model 
clearly divides impairment and disability, the Nordic social relative model sees 
impairment and disability as interacting with one another on a continuum, but 
simultaneously views disabled people as flawed and unable to perform in social roles 
in the same way as non-disabled people (Berg 2004). The basis of the Nordic social 
  
relative model appears to have been employed by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and used to expand and construct the International Classification of 
Functioning Disability and Health (ICF, WHO 2001), but a recent critique of the ICF 
using the UK social model of disability is that it merely uses different terms for 
disability and handicap and infers that the main cause of disability is impairment 
(Barnes 2012).  One aspect of the ICF is that it includes participation as one of its 
constructs, and this perhaps requires more clarification as to the ways in which 
disabled people may be enabled to participate and develop skills concerning their 
health needs, hopes, and aspirations.  
 
The North American social model of disability is linked to the Disability Rights 
Movement (DRM), developing in tandem with the Civil Rights Movement from the 
1960s onwards against the racial segregation and discrimination of black people 
(Frum 2000).    Civil rights concepts were then applied to the segregation of and 
discrimination against disabled people. Disability stemmed IURPµWKHIDLOXUHRID
structured social environment to adjust to the needs and aspirations of citizens with 
disabilities, rather than from the inability of the disabled individual to adapt to the 
demands of society¶+DKQS, mirroring arguments surrounding the 
segregation and discrimination of black people. An expansive body of work by rights 
based theorists followed exploring important social, cultural and political dimensions 
of disability (see Albrecht 1992, Albrecht et al. 2001, Albrecht and Devlieger 1999, 
2000, Amundson 1992, Davis 1995, 2010, Hahn 1985, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, Olkin 
2009, Pledger 2003, Rioux 1994, 1997, Rioux and Bach 1994, Roth 1982, 1983, Roth 
and Sugarman 1984, Wendell 1996, Zola 1982, 1989).  This work challenged the 
medicalised constructions of disabled people and looked more towards the social as a 
  
factor for disability. Discontent with the PRGHO¶Vtheoretical limitations emerged 
mainly through the work of activist and historian Paul Longmore, who famously burnt 
one of his books in 1988, in front of the federal building in Los Angeles, symbolically 
representing the injustices that the American government had extended towards 
GLVDEOHGSHRSOHDQGWKHLUWDOHQWVUHSHDWHGO\WXUQLQJWKHLUµGUHDPVWRDVKHV¶
(Longmore 2003, p. 258), by denying them full access to the opportunities to 
participate and contribute to their communities and country.   
 
In the 1990s the Disability Rights Moverment WRRNRQWKHVORJDQµ1RWKLQJ$ERXW8V
:LWKRXW8V¶ZKLFKcomes from the Latin µ1LKLOGHQRELVVLQHQRELV¶.  This phrase 
originates from, and was used specifically, in Polish foreign policy in the 1930s to 
communicate the idea that no policy should be decided by any representative without 
the full and direct participation of those whom the policy affected (Smogorzewski 
1938).  What was actually meant by full and direct participation when this policy was 
written remains unclear and open to interpretation.   
 
The difference between the North American social model of disability and the UK 
social model of disability is that North America uses a minority group rights based 
approach, ZLWKSROLWLFDODFWLRQEHLQJµEDVHGRQWKHLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQRIGLVDELOLW\¶
(Siebers 2002, p. 49), and therefore tends to omit the UK social model materialist 
focus on oppression. $QRWKHUDUJXPHQWLVWKDWµE\FRQFHQWUDWLQJRQKXPDQULJKWVWKH
SUREOHPVIDFHGE\GLVDEOHGSHRSOHPD\EHIXUWKHUH[DFHUEDWHGUDWKHUWKDQVROYHG¶
(Meekosha and Soldatic 2011, p. 1385). The vast body of work in North America 
explores important social, cultural and political dimensions of disability, but does not 
distinguish between impairment and disability akin to the UK social model.  One 
  
further argument concerning North American and UK differences is that they reflect 
WKHµLQWHOOHFWXDOSROLWLFDOSUREOHPVIDFHGLQWKHVHVRFLHWLHV¶0HHNRVKDS
For example, the UK is more focused on issues of µequality in political and material 
participation¶, whilst North America is more focused on issues of µpsychology, 
identity, personal affirmation and moral development¶ (Meekosha 2004, p.722). 
 
We can clearly see that the development of the different forms of the social model of 
disability originates from similar time frames, but from diverse historical, intellectual, 
and political positions, creating contrasting interpretations.  A key aspect of all forms 
RIWKHVRFLDOPRGHORIGLVDELOLW\GLVFXVVHGLVWKHLVVXHRIGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶V
participation; whether in their everyday lives, health care, or in policies that may 
affect everyday lives.   
 
The social model of disability µPRGHO¶ 
The UK social model of disability LVQRWUHDOO\DµPRGHO¶EHFDXVHLWRQO\SRVVHVVHV
components; oppression and disability (Altman 2001), and appears to lack definition. 
One inelegant description of a model is³$PRGHOLVDVLPSOLILHGSLFWXUHRIDSDUWRI
the real world.  It has some of the characteristics of the real world but not all of them. 
It is a set of interrelated guesses about the world. Like all pictures a model is simpler 
than the phenomHQDLWLVVXSSRVHGWRUHSUHVHQWRUH[SODLQ´Lave and Gardner 1993, 
p. 3). There is obviously a plurality of approaches for the social model of disability, 
and XVLQJ/DYHDQG*DUGQHU¶VGHILQLWLRQRIDPRGHO, it appears that the Nordic social 
relative model of disability is the closest to what may be termed a model because it 
proposes concepts and relationships between the individual and their environment and 
some mechanism of exchange or interaction.   
  
 
Criticisms of the social model of disability 
The criticisms of the social model of disability may be divided into three different 
points of observation; embodiment, oppression, and an inadequate theoretical basis 
(see attached table Appendix 1).   
 
The UK social model of disability portrays illness and impairment as being distinctly 
separate entities, and in doing so neglects to consider the social relational nature of 
impairment and illness. For example, some people may have an illness long before 
they receive a diagnosis which may then constitute impairment, and others may be 
impaired but receive a diagnosis of illness long afterwards (Charmaz 2010, p. 16).  
Impairment may also become disability through the experience of µstructural 
oppression; cultural stereotypes, attitudes, bureaucratic hierarchies, market 
mechanisms, and all that is pertaining to how society is structured and organized¶ 
(Thomas 2010, pp. 42-43).  There is currently no mechanism within the social model 
of disability that accounts for the variety of ways disability may be experienced. 
 
One argument is that the meaning of illness can be defined in terms of its 
µFRQVHTXHQFHV¶RUWKHLPSDFWLOOQHVVKDVRQWKHHYHU\GD\OLIHDQGUHODWLRQVKLSVRIDQ
LQGLYLGXDORULQWHUPVRIµVLJQLILFDQFH¶RUWKHFXOWXUDOFRQQRWDWLRQVDQGEHOLHIVWKDW
surround the diversities of illness and disability  (Bury 1991).  For example, 
impairment in the form of chronic illness or pain may curtail activity and participation 
to the extent that µthe restriction of the outside world becomes irrelevant¶DQG
impairment will remain without disabling barriers (Crow 1996:9 and 209).  Work 
around chronic illness (Locker 1983, Bury 1988, Scambler 1989, Williams 1993, 
  
Kelly 1991, Carricaburu and Pierret 1995, Edwards and Boxall 2010, amongst 
others), describes the same issues, namely, when people are physically impaired but 
simultaneously ill.  Furthermore, the work of Beresford (2004) around mental distress 
argues that the social model of disability has not engaged with the mental health field 
and issues of deviancy and dissent.  These works move away from a focus on the 
µVLFNUROH¶RUWKHGLVHDVHGERG\WRZDUGVDVSHFWVRIPHDQLQJIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDOZKLOVW
representing illness, impairment and disability as the product of µsocial relationships 
over time¶ (Williams 1998). 
 
Defining impairment and disability may exclude people with cognitive impairment, 
acquired impairment, and fluctuating impairment; failing to consider that their 
experiences of externally imposed restrictions may not be similar to those of people 
with physical impairments.  $OWHUQDWLYHO\WKHµGLVDELOLW\SDUDGR[¶ZKHUHSHRSOHDUH
impaired but do not experience disability (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999), is 
vigorously disputed by Koch (2000) on the grounds that how people cope with change 
is not considered (private accounts of impairment and disability), nor are normative 
assumptions about difference. What is important here is who defines disability and for 
what purposes. Defining is a social practice and carries with it an exercise of power 
and some people identifying as disabled are not considered by medical, other 
SURIHVVLRQVDQGWKHSXEOLFEHFDXVHWKH\IDLOWRµUHFRJQLVHWKHLUGLVDEOLQJFRQGLWLRQV
>«@¶ (Wendell 1996, p.23-25).   
 
The majority of the criticisms of the social model of disability appear to be centred on 
a social constructionist interpretation of disablement which argues for the inclusion of 
embodied experiences in disability accounts.  One argument is that the social model 
  
of disability does not engage with embodied experience, and although separating the 
ERG\IURPFXOWXUHKDVPHDQWSROLWLFDOJDLQVLWKDVEHHQDWWKHFRVWRIGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶V
LGHQWLWLHV+XJKHVDQG3DWHUVRQµJLIWLQJ¶WKHERG\WRPHGLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
Another argument is that it focuses on physical impairment and does not take 
difference into consideration (Chappell 1998).  For example, people with learning 
difficulties may be excluded from a social model analysis because adjusting the social 
environment is not always possible, leaving personal and social differences 
unacknowledged and undifferentiated, rendering the social model of disability 
essentialist (Corker 2002, Terzi 2004),  and limiting understandings of disability 
(Williams 1999), highlighting differences, and excluding experiences.  
 
The social model of disability appears sufficient as a basic, albeit extremely 
successful political tool, but its uses need to be expanded in order to create more 
enabling platforms, and improve its explanatory power (Corker 1999, Finklestein 
2001).  Indeed, critical disability studies are one area that has developed partly in 
reaction to the dominant materialist stance (Meekosha and Shuttleworth 2009). What 
may assist with the further development of critical disability studies is building a 
conceptual model that will enable an appreciation of difference and embed plurality 
into a frame of action.  
 
Solidarity and oppression 
The politics of disablement in some critiques focus on oppression as the main 
component of disability. Oppression is a nebulous concept, poorly understood and 
under theorised, indeed, little is known of how oppression moderates the relationships 
  
between culture, language and socialisation (Shakespeare 1994, Imrie 1997, Hughes 
1999). 
 
In this sense, the social model of disability resists transformation and fails to 
adequately theorise disabled peoplH¶VH[SHULHQFHVRILPSDLUPHQWUHVWLQJ on the praxis 
of solidarity in the interests of liberation.  In solidarity people may gather and 
challenge oppression, but there is also little room for recognition of the individual 
body because this undermines the very ethos of solidarity.  One contention about 
analysing oppression is that it then points to essential differences between the lives of 
disabled and non-disabled people (Abberley 1987, p.7).  In its current form, the UK 
social model of disability presumes all disabled people experience oppression, and 
ignores lived experiences of impairment. Exploring experiences means that 
differences between disabled people will emerge, for example differences between 
people with learning difficulties and physically impaired people, reinforcing the 
individual (medical) model.  More complexity then arises because disability is diverse 
and there has been a lack of appreciation of the mechanisms producing disability. 
Risking reifying oppression into one form; the physical. A clearly agreed theoretical 
approach can facilitate building solidarity and consensus and recognising difference 
can enable a better appreciation of why consensus may be difficult to achieve. 
 
Oppression and power 
Oppression is present in different forms according to different epistemologies of 
power; Giddens (1976) denoting power as dependency and domination; Parsons 
(1967) equating power with authority; Foucault (1977, 1980) and the inherently 
productive quality of disciplinary power; Arendt (1972) and the plurality of power; 
  
and Lukes (1974, 2005) three faces of power which concentrate on the exclusion of 
others through governmental decision-making, non-decision-making and ideological 
power.  
 
Only one understanding of the social model exists under the concept of oppression in 
that attention is directed towards social and political environments giving rise to the 
politics of disablement (Smith 2010).  This permits exploration of social and political 
processes which construct discrimination by excluding disabled people, but 
simultaneously ignores their lived or private experiences of impairment. 
 
Thomas (2007) produces a comprehensive account of social oppression using the 
writings of Young (1990) and Fraser (1985<RXQJ¶VILYHIDFHVRI
power are criteria used to determine ways people are oppressed.  Construed within a 
capitalist and essentialist paradigm; concentrating on equating power with 
domination; proposing the logical and empirical implication of power to and power 
over.  Using analyses of power, we may explore the mechanisms of power, arguing 
that relations of power and oppression constitute social relations in modern societies.  
This is not as simple as it may appear because disability is not an absolute dichotomy, 
and there is a strong relationship between disability, social practices, and impairment. 
 
The sociology of power 
 
From the late twentieth century µpower as a phenomenon has become a matter of 
theoretical contention¶;  through the processes of post modernisation and globalisation 
there have been shifts in contexts, and transitions in thinking (Drake 2010, p.26).   
  
Within the existing sociological analysis of power there are different theoretical 
perspectives, thematically these may be broadly divided into; Marxism, pluralism, and 
elitism.  We can also argue that sociology as a discipline has been organised to 
privilege the public realm and there has been an under theorisation of the private in 
sociological thought which has implications for power. 
 
The various theorists have already been explored in depth in the existing literature; 
therefore I will address Marxism which underpins the social model of disability, 
contrast this approach with pluralism, and then focus on the ideas of Hannah Arendt.  
,VXJJHVWWKDW$UHQGW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISRZHUPD\SURYLGHWKHEULGJHEHWZHHQ
impairment and disability. It may also offer disability studies a model of theorising 
disability that accounts for difference without privileging impairment or disability.  
 
Marxism and the social model of disability 
 
Marxism has been the key underpinning force for the UK social model of disability in 
particular.  This has a tendency to concentrate more on the social and political whilst 
occluding the private from capitalist production. The consequence for disability 
VWXGLHVLVWKDWGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHVremain excluded because the underlying 
theoretical framework has not been thoroughly addressed.  In concentrating on 
economic relationships and conflicts using Marxism there is a tendency to either 
overlook other forms of (non-economic) conflict or attempt to explain these conflicts 
as ultimately having economic roots. Confusion within and around disability studies 
then remains because Marxism examines social relationships in terms of their 
conflictual basis; reifying oppression.   
  
 
In splitting impairment and disability and shifting the focus on impairment towards 
the social as being oppressive and consequently disabling towards disabled people, 
the social model of disability SROLWLFLVHVGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VVWUXJJOHV; raising awareness 
and challenging the established norms in society. One way of unpicking this could be 
to use the work of Foucault (1980, 1982, and 1988), although Foucault does not 
totally conceive of power in coercive terms, he perceives power as providing people 
with the ability to do things and that it only operates when people have some freedom.  
This then portrays power in terms of action because people need to have freedom to 
exercise power.  )RU)RXFDXOWSHRSOH¶VSULYDWHZRUOGVDUHJRYHUQHGE\D
public/political world of knowledge and power and the private world reflects the 
political.  
 
A recent convincing Foucauldian analysis of disability ³VKRZLQJDFDXVDOUHODWLRQ
between impDLUPHQWDQGGLVDELOLW\´KDVEHHQSURSRVHGTremain 2010 p.11). We can 
also suggest that social constructions may criticise, challenge, or destroy some area 
that they dislike in the established social order of things, but in doing so they merely 
describe relations rather than change them (Hacking 1999, p.7).  Therefore we could 
argue that social constructions do not always liberate because they are dealing with an 
µHQGSURGXFW¶ 
 
Social constructionists do not take into consideration the diversity of disabled people, 
and as a result can almost reify a medical model approach. For example, some 
analyses of the body envisage it as an µobject that is produced and regulated by 
political, normative and discursive regimes and is therefore a location for the 
  
transmission of the regimes and all subject to them¶ (Shilling 2012, p.242). Bryan 
Turner (1984, 1995) proposes that embodiment is a process and we become embodied 
through our interactions with historical, cultural, and societal formations.  Turner 
suggests that bodies change over time, and function differently within fluctuating 
VRFLDOVSDFHVDQLQWHUDFWLRQDOSURFHVVWKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHµZKROH¶Arguing against 
separating the body and society he proposes societal understanding and appreciation 
of the embodied individual.  $OWKRXJK7XUQHU¶V work is effective in highlighting how 
the body is a location for the transmission of power, he remains silent about the lived 
experience of embodied agency and does not elaborate further, or provide any 
suggestions as to how understanding and appreciation may proceed.  As such it 
becomes difficult, if not impossible to build on his earlier points leaving the body a 
powerless object.  
 
Social constructionists challenge the essentialist notions that disabled people can have 
a singular and unproblematic identity, but this simultaneously challenges accounts of 
a collective identity based on a set of core features shared by members of a group and 
no others (Calhoun 1994). This point has already been articulated by disability 
researchers and critical disability studies in that the social model of disability ignores 
the importance of culture, cultural processes, and fails to analyse the socio-political 
contexts in which attitudes and values towards disability are constructed, omitting the 
importance of agency and social practice (Shakespeare and Watson 1997, Imrie 1997, 
Corker 1999, Corker 2002, p.24, Thomas 2010, Meekosha and Soldatic 2011).  The 
importance of agency and production is further emphasised by Connell;  
  
µ7RXQGHUVWDQGVRFLDOHPERGLPHQWZHQHHGWRUHFRJQLVHWKHDJHQF\RIERGLHV
not only their materiality as objects, but also their productive power in social 
UHODWLRQVKLSV>«@¶&RQQHOOS 
Using a Marxian or social constructionist approach may also unintentionally construct 
all disabled people as passive victims of dominant discourses presenting a negative 
and somewhat powerless conception of disabled people.  
 
Pluralism and disability 
 
In contrast, pluralism claims to explain the nature and distribution of power within 
Western democracies and there is a general acceptance that the state exercises 
legitimate rather than coercive power, through a fixed amount of power distributed 
WKURXJKRXWVRFLHW\7KLVLVLQRSSRVLWLRQWR3DUVRQ¶V (1960, 1967) functionalist 
approach where there is a variable-sum of power held by society as a whole.   
Pluralists do not accept that members of society share common interests and values 
towards all issues; they recognise diversity, and disability as an analytic category is 
routinely omitted from understandings of diversity (Davis 2011).  The notion of 
plurality brings in the notion of diversity and allows for sameness (which is not 
necessarily coterminous with identity) in difference between disabled people.   
Engaging with pluralism emphasises mediation between different groups and the 
interests of one particular group are not afforded permanent prominence/dominance.  
Democratic interests and action are foremost and all sections of society and different 
political opinions may be represented, reflecting the diversity of groups in the human 
population.  Power in this sense is more closely aligned with social relations, and is 
probably aligned very closely with constitutive power which is the power of members 
  
of society to act; emphasising their agency (Drake 2010, p. 49). This focus on social 
UHODWLRQVGHPRFUDWLFLQWHUHVWVDQGGLYHUVLW\ZRXOGDSSHDUWRµILW¶PRUHSRVLWLvely 
with the politics of disabled people.  
 
Arendt, plurality and power 
 
Hannah Arendt argues that there are three realms to social life; µpolitical, social and 
private¶ (Arendt 2003, p. 211).  One suggestion is that keeping the social and political 
distinct and in their place is problematic because it may serve to legitimise material 
inequality (Bowring 2011).  For example, disability, unlike gender or race, is 
generally not considered to be a relation of social power in which everyone is 
LPSOLFDWHG8VLQJ$UHQGW¶VWKUHHUHDOPVPHDQVWKDWZHhave the potential to engage 
with an intersectional and politically informed position to analyse disability and 
impairment.  Within sociology, there is a renewed focus on the private as the 
significance of the public realm increases, and awareness that there is a mutuality of 
the private and public with one constituting the other by a set of powerful discourses 
(Bailey 2000).   In contrast, the social model of disability appears to focus mainly on 
the political and touches on the social but pays little or no attention to the private, 
synonymous with its Marxist underpinnings.   
 
$UHQGW¶VQRWLRQRISROLWLFDOSRZHULVGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPWHOHRORJLFDOPRGHOVWKDW
render it synonymous with coercion.  Instead, Arendt conceptualises political power 
through a more democratic means derived partly from the work of Habermas in which 
a common will is formed in a µcommunication directed by reaching agreement¶ 
(Habermas 1994, p. 212).  Bowring (2011) suggests that Arendt would differ slightly 
  
IURP+DEHUPDVLQWKHVXJJHVWLRQRIDµFRPPRQZLOO¶EHFDXVHVKHGLGQRWHQYLVDJH
collective action as a pursuit of common will, but more in terms of the persuasive 
power of action through logical reasoning, or autonomy over consensus.  Using this 
position, Arendt would endorse the political movement of the social model of 
disaELOLW\EHFDXVHVKHDUJXHVWKDW³>«@3RZHULVQHYHUWKHSURSHUW\RIDQLQGLYLGXDO
it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keep 
WRJHWKHU´$UHQGWSFor Arendt, diversity is important because she 
suggests that community cannot be divorced from the individual because of the 
essentiality of community to freedom.  For example, an attack on disabled people 
would be an attack on human diversity.  Simultaneously she would also disagree with 
the silencing of the private realm of disabled people which she would envisage as 
conflicting with the preservation of plurality and heterogeneity as a condition of their 
freedom.   
  
For Arendt, disabled people are united because they should occupy the same public 
world as all of us in which we encounter each other politically as equal citizens. We 
are all mutually committed to its continuance, but politically can see the world from 
different aspects. This approach enables polyphonic experiences, feelings, and 
behaviours to emerge emphasising the coexistence of different relational forms and 
the multifacetedness of social relations. It has already been argued that there is a 
µWUHPHQGRXVFRQFHSWXDOJDSEHWZHHQEHLQJLPSDLUHGDQGEHLQJGLVDEOHG¶, and using 
the term disabled immediately adds a political element (Davis 1995, p. 10).  This 
infers that social relations are important for exploring that conceptual gap.  
 
  
Critical realism has also been proposed as bridging the gap between chronic illness 
and disability, and a way of avoiding arguments over the social and medical models 
(Williams 1999, Shakespeare 2006, 2014, Watson 2012). Although there is some 
argument over its interpretation, cULWLFDOUHDOLVWVFODLPWKDWµLWLVWKHPHGLDWHGQHVVRI
NQRZOHGJHWKDWLVVWUHVVHG¶6HOODUVS, and focus more on plurality and 
different relational forms. There are three levels of reality: an empirical level 
consisting of our experiences; an actual level consisting of events and phenomena; 
and a real (or deep) level consisting of a multitude of mechanisms and structures that 
sustain and generate actual events and phenomena (Bhaskar, 1975: 56).  We can 
perhaps suggest a link here with $UHQGW¶VSROLWLFDOSULYDWH, and social that is worthy 
of further exploration.  
 
If we return briefly to the social relational model of disability which seeks to make 
room for impairment within disability studies using the concept of impairment effects 
(see Thomas 1999, 2001, and 2007), although some may argue that impairment 
effects actually over complicate an already complicated situation (Shakespeare and 
Watson 2010).  More recently, others have tried to use the concept of impairment 
effects but struggled to identify where the boundaries of disability and impairment 
began and ended, and suggest that analysing the public and private dimensions of 
living with a chronic condition enabled them to better ascertain where the boundaries 
lay (Owens et al 2014). 
For the social relational model, disability is viewed DVµDIRUPRIVRFLDORSSUHVVLRQ
involving the social imposition of restrictions of activity on people with impairments 
and the socially engendered undermining of their psycho-emotional well-EHLQJ¶
(Thomas, 1999: 60).  The model identifies pathways of oppression which operate at 
  
both the structural and psycho-emotional level, and in part emphasises the coexistence 
of different social relational forms, but keeping oppression as its foundation may limit 
its use.   
 
2QHLPSRUWDQWQXDQFHLQ$UHQGW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISRZHULVWKDWRISOXUDOLW\7KLV
emphasises diversity in the lives of human beings, generating the potential of a 
constructed community through speech and action.  Difference within the social 
model of disability could be revised because $UHQGW¶Vconception of plurality 
UHFRJQLVHVKXPDQEHLQJV¶GLYHUVLW\7KLVmay overcome the conflation of power and 
LGHQWLW\ZLWKGLVDEOHGSHRSOHIRUPLQJµPDUJLQDOLVHGRUGLVDGYDQWDJHGJURXSV¶Marks 
(1999a, 1999b) is amongst critical disability studies theorists who share a view of 
disablism using Marxian theory but have also begun to recognise that marginalization 
is a relational concept, emerging through the interactions between non-disabled and 
disabled people, and frequently experienced through internalised experiences of 
oppression and ZKDWKDVEHHQWHUPHGµSV\FKR-HPRWLRQDOGLVDEOLVP¶5HHYH
2004, 2006).  Marks (1999b) argues that oppression occurs because disabled people 
disrupt cultural, political, and social perceptions of the normative body. In contrast, 
Arendt suggests WKHµDOORZDQFHIRUGLIIHUHQFH¶ is built on the notion of difference 
being ascribed to various political identities. Her agonistic conception of action would 
allow a denaturalisation of disabled identities revealing them to be unstable and 
therefore revisable. This mirrors the fluid social body of Shildrick (2009) who argues 
against a biological/social division and, instead, recasts the body as a complex site of 
cultural and corporeal production. Shildrick forces us to think about the disabled body 
in productive ways which challenges normative thinking. Through reflection, non-
normative bodies become denaturalised and revised enabling a narrative of bodily 
  
potential (Overboe 2007).   There are echoes of Arendt who focuses on struggle as 
part of action, but is in opposition to the Marxian focus on materialism because for 
her the outcome is positive and does not focus on oppression.   
 
Arendt defines plurality both as equality and distinction in that we are all separate 
individuals, this sameness in difference allows for elaboration of the complexities, 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQVDQGFRPPRQDVSHFWVRIGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHVLQVWHDGRI
incorporating them into one collective understanding that excludes aspects of each 
SHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFH5HHYH¶V (2002, 2004, 2006) expanded concept of psycho-
emotional disablism has already opened up a discursive space, and partly mirrors this 
approach because she argues that not all disabled people experience oppression, and 
calls for pathways of oppression operating at both the public and personal level.  This 
concept is a valuable contribution towards expanding the social model of disability. 
One additional suggestion may be that if we move the focus away from its 
materialistic underpinnings and use the political, social and private, then theoretically 
we have a more productive and communicative position from which to argue.  This 
may solve the issues that disability and sociology theorists experience with 
embodiment and the social model of disability. 
 
This returns us to the issue that the social model of disability is merely a concept and 
one suggestion may be that work needs to be done to develop a workable model. For 
example, we could introduce the realms of the political, social and private.  The 
private realm in particular needs greater emphasis and bringing into the public realm; 
rather than this having a negative impact on the identity of disabled people because 
the private would still remain SULYDWHLQDVPXFK³>«@3ULYDWHSUREOHPVGRQRWWXUQ
  
into public issues by dint of being vented in public; even under public gaze they do 
QRWFHDVHWREHSULYDWH>«@´%DXPDQS  What Bauman appears to be 
saying here is that social policy can only be formed if private problems are made 
public because if a problem is seen as a private issue, then public responsibilities are 
forgotten. When they are seen as public problems then action ensues. An example of 
private problems being made public has promoted the development of accessible 
spaces and work environments for disabled people through the use of legislation.  
 
Using $UHQGW¶VWKUHHUHDOPVZRXOGDOORZXVWRH[SORUHWKHFRQWH[WVLQZKLFKGLVDEOHG
people experience rather than automatically assume oppression in all contexts.  Work 
in critical disability studies has already begun in this area but may benefit from the 
insights of Arendt and enable us to define oppression more distinctly by identifying 
the relations that lead to this construct. It would also open up a discursive space 
whereby the private realm could be considered and issues such as health disparities 
explored without objectifying and disabling people with impairments.  
 
Conclusion 
It appears that the confusion surrounding the social model of disability results partly 
from the presence of different forms.  Although these different forms developed at 
roughly the same historical time, they simultaneously have diverse historical and 
political positions which contribute to the muddle.  Layered on top of this is the issue 
that the social model of disability is not a model as it stands but the potential is there 
to develop a workable and useable model.  Then the Marxist notion of power 
presumes and envisages oppression as a class or economic phenomenon, but becomes 
counterproductive.  Critical disability studies have begun to discursively challenge 
  
these older ways of thinking and to some extent have moved the disability debate 
forwards, but perhaps we are not quite there yet. This paper adds to the discussion in 
suggesting that there may be merit in drawing on Arendt, illustrating some of the 
benefits in providing a more nuanced idea of the pluralist body and experience. Using 
$UHQGW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRISRZHUmay further provide us with a way to engender more 
collective action through solidarity and consensus.     
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 Point of 
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Authors date and page 
number 
Examples of Criticisms of the social model of disability Interpretation of all Criticisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMBODIMENT 
Hughes and Paterson (1997, p. 
330, 326, 329), Edwards (2008, 
p.26), Thomas (2004, p. 579) 
³7KHVRFLDOPRGHORIGLVDELOLW\KDVQRWHQWHUWDLQHGGHEDWHVWKDW
problematise the body [...] presupposes an untenable separation between 
ERG\DQGFXOWXUH´ (Hughes and Paterson 1997) 
Does not engage with embodied experience 
and although separating the body from culture 
has meant political gains it has been at the cost 
RIGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VLGHQWLWLHV7KLVµJLIWV¶WKH
body to medical interpretation.  
Chappell (1998, p.213),  
Dewsbury et al. (1998, p.146), 
Taylor (2005, p.505), Humphrey 
(2000, p. 81), Shildrick (2005, p. 
767), Vedder (2005, p. 107, 113, 
116), Edwards, (2008, p.26) 
It focuses on the body as the site of physical impairment and excludes 
people with learning difficulties from its analysis, thus privileging one 
form of impaired identity over another, ignoring difference.  
Focus is on physical impairment, and does not 
take difference into consideration; creating a 
hierarchy of impairment. This also ignores 
people with chronic illness and/or fluctuating 
impairments, delegitimizing their status as 
disabled. Research may reify this position 
because it ignores impaired experience.  
Williams (1999, p.803), Morris 
(1991, p.10), Pinder (1995, p. 
605), Terzi (2004, p. 155), Corker 
(2002, p. 23), Young (2001, p. 
xiii) 
 
³$IRUPRIHVVHQWLDOLVP>«@FRQFHUQLQJWKHERG\FUHHSVLQWKURXJKWKH
EDFNGRRU>«@ZKLFKHVFKHZVDQ\GLVFXVVLRQRILPSDLUPHQWRU
IXQFWLRQDOOLPLWDWLRQ>«@´:LOOLDPV S³>«@SK\VLFDO
UHVWULFWLRQVDUHHQWLUHO\VRFLDOO\FUHDWHG>«@´0RUULVS 
Is essentialist because it ignores embodied 
experience reifying the social; thereby limiting 
understandings of disability because personal 
experiences and social barriers remain 
undifferentiated.  
Table 1: Criticisms of the Social Model of Disability 
 Morris (1998, p. 13), Swain and 
French (2000, p.571), Clear and 
Gleeson (2001, p. 41-42), 
Shakespeare and Watson (1997, 
p. 298, 299), Crow (1992, p.7) 
³,IZHFOHDUO\VHSDUDWHRXWGLVDELOLW\DQGLPSDLUPHQWWKHQZHFDQ
FDPSDLJQDJDLQVWWKHGLVDEOLQJEDUULHUVDQGDWWLWXGHV>«@+RZHYHULQ
focussing on the external barriers we have tended to push to one side 
WKHH[SHULHQFHRIRXUERGLHV>«@´0RUULV p.13)  
Engaging with the politics of disablement 
favours a materialist/Marxist worldview which 
PHDQVLJQRULQJGLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VHPERGLHG
experiences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPPRESSION 
Shakespeare (1994, p. 296) ³>«@The Social Model needs to be reconceptualised: people with 
impairment are disabled, not just by material discrimination, but also by 
prejudice. This prejudice is not just interpersonal; it is also implicit in 
cultural representation, in language and in socialization >«@´ 
Oppression is present in society but it takes 
different forms both explicit and implicit, but 
when and how these forms materialise is 
unclear.  Oppression may also be transmitted 
by culture, but little is known of how 
oppression moderates the relationships between 
culture, language and socialisation.  
Imrie (1997, p. 267) ³>«@by locating sources of oppression solely in 'attitudes', there is little 
sense of their social location or origins, or of how attitudes, in 
themselves, are translated, if at all, into oppressive actions >«@´ 
Oppression is a somewhat nebulous concept 
because it is not understood how attitudes 
become translated into actions, and if indeed 
this actually occurs. 
Hughes (1999, p.160), Abberley 
(1987, p.7) 
³>«@7KHPRGHOLVGXDOLVWLF>«@WKHUROHRILPSDLUPHQWLQthe 
constitution of oppression is limited by the very focus which makes it 
VXFKDSRZHUIXOWRRO>«@´+XJKHV 
Oppression is poorly understood and therefore 
any further development of the social model is 
limited by the lack of conceptualisation. 
Shakespeare and Watson (2001, 
p. 10, 14) 
 
 
³,WVVWUHQJWKKDVEHFRPHDSUREOHP >«@3HRSOHDUHGLVDEOHGE\ERWK
VRFLDOEDUULHUVDQGWKHLUERGLHV>«@WKH%ULWLVKVRFLDOPRGHODSSURDFK
EHFDXVHLWµRYHU-HJJVWKHSXGGLQJ¶ULVNVGLVFUHGLWLQJWKHHQWLUHGLVK´ 
In concentrating entirely on oppression the 
social model of disability has become a straw 
man and is at risk of doing a disservice to 
disabled people. 
  
Corker (2002, p. 24), Shakespeare 
and Watson  (1997, p.304), 
Meekosha and Soldatic (2011) 
 
 
It focuses on structure and the built environment at the expense of 
µDJHQF\¶DQGµVRFLDOSUDFWLFH¶DQGIDLOVWRUHFRJQLVH³the way in which 
structure and agency are intrinsically knit together´ 
 
 Disability is not an absolute dichotomy and 
there is a strong relationship between disability, 
social practices, and impairment. 
  
Shakespeare (2010, p.270) ³,WDVVXPHVZKDWLWQHHGVWRSURYHWKDWGLVDEOHGSHRSOHDUHRSSUHVVHG´ Displays a priori thinking concerning 
oppression, applying it to all disabled people in 
defining disability as oppression. 
Williams (1999, p.812) ³>«@HQGRUVHPHQWRIGLVDELOLW\VROHO\DVVRFLDORSSUHVVLRQLVUHDOO\RQO\
an option, and an erroneous one at that, for those spared the ravages of 
FKURQLFLOOQHVV>«@´ 
Using oppression in one form ; the social, is a 
mistake because it reifies disability as the 
physical  
 
INADEQUATE 
THEORETICAL 
BASIS 
Corker (1999, p. 629),  
Longmore (2003) 
³>«@LQVWHDGRIµWU\LQJWRVWUHWFKWKHVRFLDOPRGHOIXUWKHUWKDQLW
intended to JR¶ZLWKWRWDOLVLQJFODLPVDERXWLWVH[SODQDWRU\SRZHUZH
VKRXOGYLHZLWDVRQHVWUDQG>«@DQGFRQVLGHUWKDWWKHUHPD\ZHOOEH
RWKHUVWUDQGVVRPHRIZKLFKKDYHQRW\HWEHHQIXOO\GHYHORSHG´ 
(Corker 1999) 
The social model of disability needs to be 
further developed in order to fully explain 
GLVDEOHGSHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHV 
Finklestein (2001, p.10) ³7KHVRFLDOPRGHOGRHVQRWH[SODLQZKDWGLVDELOLW\LV)RUDQ
H[SODQDWLRQZHZRXOGQHHGDVRFLDOWKHRU\RIGLVDELOLW\´ 
The components of disability need to be further 
conceptualised in order to improve the 
explanatory power of the social model. 
  
